been concerned about for some time, and one for which no easy solution seems likely. Bill Clinton's secretary of defense, Les Aspin, outlined the problem as far back as December 1993:
During the Cold War, our principal adversary had conventional forces in Europe that were numerically superior. For us, nuclear weapons were the equalizer. The threat to use them was present and was used to compensate for our smaller numbers of conventional forces.
Today, nuclear weapons can still be the equalizer against superior conventional forces. But today it is the United States that has unmatched conventional military power, and it is our potential adversaries who may attain nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Aspin concluded, the United States could wind up being the equalized.
ii Or, to take an earlier example, John F. Kennedy acknowledged in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis that even a small number of nuclear weapons could deter even the most powerful states.
A central element of the proliferation debate revolves around the perceived effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. If deterrence works reliably, as optimists argue, then there is presumably less to be feared in the spread of nuclear weapons. But if nuclear deterrence does not work reliably, pessimists maintain, more nuclear weapons states will presumably lead not just to a more complicated international arena but a far more dangerous one.
Some analysts have made a compelling case that the fear of nuclear proliferation or the spread of nuclear weapon has been exaggerated. Some go even further and argue that proliferation may actually increase global stability. It is an argument peculiar to nuclear weaponry, as it does not apply and is not made with regard to other so-called weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons. Nuclear weapons are simply so destructive, this school of thought argues, that using them is such a high bar that it would be madness itself to launch against a nuclear-armed foe. Put another way, nuclear states should know better than to fight wars with each other. The argument that proliferation is not necessarily a dire threat has been made in expansions both lateral -to other countries -and verticalin the growth of nuclear stockpiles. "Since 1945," remarked Michael Mandelbaum, twenty-five years ago, "the more nuclear weapons each has accumulated, the less likely, on the whole, it has seemed that either side would use them." Others have made similar arguments. Kenneth Waltz maintains, for example, that nuclear weapons preserve an "imperfect peace" on the subcontinent between India and Pakistan. Responding to reports that all Pentagon war games involving India and Pakistan always end in a nuclear exchange, Waltz argues that "Has everyone in that building forgotten that deterrence works precisely because nuclear states fear that conventional military engagements may escalate to the nuclear level, and therefore they draw back from the brink?"
It was an idea frequently debated during the Cold War. French military strategist General Pierre
Gallois observed in 1960 that the path to greater stability lay in the increased proliferation. "Few people are able to grasp that precisely because the new weapons have a destructive power out of all proportion to even the highest stakes, they impose a far more stable balance than the world has known in the past," he said. "Nor is it any easier to make people realize that the more numerous and terrible the retaliatory weapons possessed by both sides, the surer the peace…and that it is actually more dangerous to limit nuclear weapons than to let them proliferate." Gallois made this argument in the context of justifying the French bomb and increasing NATO nuclear capabilities. "These," Gallois concluded, "are the realities of our time, but no one is willing to accept them at first blush."
iii Notwithstanding a few notable proponents of the "proliferation equals more security" argument, the weight of opinion is mainly on the other side of the ledger, heightened, especially since 9/11, that the spread of nuclear weapons is a bad thing -a very bad thing, in fact. The issues driving nuclear-armed states and even terrorist groups are no longer just political; we have also seen the obsessiveness of religious fundamentalism, which does not seem amenable either to diplomacy or humanitarian restraint.
Indeed, since 9/11 the "rules" have changed and experts suggest that there are at least some terrorists who do want to inflict mass casualties. In this context, nuclear terrorism not only represents an effort to intimidate and coerce, but also poses a critical threat to states and peoples around the world.
Political scientist Scott Sagan has also highlighted the ways in which organizations and communications can fail; for example, rather than being anomalies, accidents should be seen as an inherent part of organizations. When nuclear weapons are thrown into the mix, the risk of catastrophic accidents becomes inevitable. Moreover, Sagan holds the view that a fundamental level of risk is inherent in all nuclear weapons organizations regardless of nationality or region. Clearly, it is an element that compounds the problem of nuclear weapons in regions still embroiled by centuries-old religious, cultural, and ethnic tensions, to be sure with many old scores to settle. All of these elements combine in a barely controllable milieu of states' nuclear weapons policy, a disaster waiting to happen.
Halting the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
This invariably leads us to our second, essential question: How can a nation -or a community of nations -prevent the spread of nuclear weapons? Since the question was first raised during the closing stages of the World War II, a wide range of answers have been given and tried, ranging from the legislative, through international norms and treaties, and even preventive military action. None has proved entirely satisfactory.
Whereas the Baruch Plan of 1946 equated controlling the atom and disarmament, President Dwight D. Eisenhower managed to separate the two in his 1953 proposal known as "Atoms for Peace." The focus of the proposal was on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, not on disarmament. In a speech to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, Eisenhower called for a renewed emphasis on peaceful uses of atomic energy and on providing commercial incentives for reaping the benefits of atomic energy. The price was that all fissile material would be placed under the custody of a UN agency.
Again, the initiative met with mixed success. On the plus side, it contributed directly to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in July 1957, charged with monitoring and encouraging the safe use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, while acting as an international, neutral watchdog of nuclear weapons transfers and developments. The Vienna-based IAEA, a United Nations-affiliated organization with 137 member countries, has played an increasingly important role in recent years, but its power depends heavily and ultimately on international political tides. On the negative side, a few nations, notably India, chose to use the Atoms for Peace project to establish their own nuclear weapons programs.
In the 1950s and 1960s, while the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France built their nuclear arsenals, frequent estimates of the future size of the nuclear-armed community centered on twodozen states. But with the People's Republic of China's initial nuclear test in October 1964, a worried White House and Kremlin hastily put forth proposals to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons. In the so-called Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, which had been discussing this matter, nonaligned members argued that a non-proliferation treaty must not simply divide the world into nuclear "haves"
and "have nots," but must balance obligations. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968 after the Americans and the Soviets reluctantly agreed "to pursue obligations in good faith" to halt the arms race "at the earliest possible date" (the fig leaf they discouraged from developing an independent nuclear option and offers were made for a European nuclear force instead. None of these efforts was decisive.
Not every nuclear and prospective nuclear power has regarded the NPT and its subsequent indefinite renewal in 1995 positively. iv After all, the NPT is specifically designed to freeze the status quo. The leading nuclear states party to the treaty naturally regarded this as a positive arrangement because it preserved their status while retaining their freedom with respect to modernizing their own nuclear arsenals, which they have clearly done. But other countries such as India, also not a signatory to the treaty, saw it as exclusionary on the part of the established nuclear powers and bristled at what it perceived to be the nuclear double standards of the West, Russia and China. For, according to former Indian defense minister K.C. Pant, "We very seriously proposed a 15-year plan for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. However, after the NPT was extended 'in perpetuity', it was apparent the big powers had no intention of shedding their nuclear arsenal." India may well have gone nuclear because of double standards and the wish to be taken seriously.
v Disarmament critics also argue that under the NPT, the nuclear powers should not be expanding their nuclear arsenals but rather moving towards total nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the treaty is clear: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
Moreover, continue critics, what possible purpose could nuclear weapons serve in the war on international terrorism? And could not the expense of modernizing nuclear forces be better put to use?
Typically, and in defense of his government's decision to update and replace the United Kingdom's Trident nuclear weapons system, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair responded to his opposition by pointing out that the NPT did not commit member states to total disarmament but rather to negotiations on effective measures and that his government had fulfilled this pledge. It had, in fact, cut its nuclear weapons explosive capacity by 70 percent since the end of the Cold War, given up bombs carried by strategic aircraft, and reduced the operational readiness of its four Vanguard submarines, each carrying 16 U.S.-supplied Trident ballistic missiles equipped with up to three warheads. In any case, only one submarine was on patrol at any one time and would require several day's notice to fire.
Nonetheless, there was considerable resistance. On February 24, 2007, the national "No Trident" demonstration brought up to 100,000 protestors to the streets of London to demand the government reverse its plans to build a new generation of nuclear weapons to replace Trident. There was also considerable resistance from Labour MPs, and enough of them voted against the Trident replacement proposal to force Blair to rely on support from the Conservatives. By the end of March, Blair got his way: a replacement submarine, including missiles and warheads, and even that would be no less than 17 years in the making.
Clearly, nuclear proliferation is one of the key challenges to the stability of the contemporary international system, and the current non-proliferation regime seems increasingly unable and, perhaps, unwilling to meet the expectations of its designers. Since the signature of the NPT in 1968, nuclear powers have barely fulfilled their commitments to reduce their atomic arsenals, while the number of non-nuclear states that have crossed the threshold status and are now regarded as full-fledged atomic powers has increased and threatens to keep growing. What can be done about it?
In recent years, a team of leading nonproliferation experts, assembled by the Carneige Endowment for International Peace, offered a sober blueprint for rethinking the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. They offered a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists, nuclear weapons, and fissile materials alike. According to their plan, an effective strategy for nuclear security will require universal compliance with the norms and rules of a toughened nuclear nonproliferation policy, where compliance means more than declarations of good intent. In future, it will also mean actual performance. Universal, moreover, means that nonproliferation norms and rules must be extended not only to treaty members, but to all states and to individuals and corporations as well.
Six obligations, expanded below, form the essential core of the universal compliance strategy;
together, they constitute a balance of obligations among the nuclear and non-nuclear states, while erecting a defense-in-depth against the spread of nuclear weapons. They are: making nonproliferation irreversible; devaluing the political and military currency of nuclear weapons; securing all nuclear materials; stopping illegal transfers; committing to conflict resolution; and solving the Three-State Problem, i.e., persuading India, Israel, and Pakistan to accept the same nonproliferation obligations accepted by the weapon state signatories to the NPT. The alternative, with the human misery that would most likely occur, would be a deadly lesson in consequence management, for which there are no real answers.
vi Obligation One: Make Nonproliferation Irreversible. The goal here is to radically revise the rules managing the production of fissile material, while clarifying and tightening the terms by which states can withdraw from the NPT. This could best be accomplished by precluding the acquisition of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants by any additional state; providing, in return, internationally guaranteed, economically attractive supplies of the fuel services necessary to meet nuclear energy demands; ending the production of highly enriched uranium worldwide, while adopting a temporary "pause" in the separation of plutonium; passing a new UN Security Council resolution making a state that withdraws from the NPT fully responsible for violations committed while it was still a party to the treaty; barring states withdrawing from the treaty from illegally using nuclear assets acquired from abroad before their withdrawal; and suspending nuclear cooperation with countries that the IAEA cannot certify are in full compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
Obligation Two: Devalue the Political and Military Currency of Nuclear Weapons.
Specifically, all states must diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and international politics, while the nuclear weapon states must do more to make their nonproliferation commitments Obligation Five: Commit to Conflict Resolution. This is recognition of the simple fact that the proliferation problem cannot be solved by nonproliferation measure alone. This would require concentrating the diplomatic influence of the major powers on resolving the regional conflicts that underlie states' pursuit of security through nuclear weapons. And there are plenty of places to start. warning. Moreover, the United States remains prepared to initiate the use of these weapons by the decision of one person, the president -against either a nuclear or non-nuclear enemy, whenever the president believes that it is deemed in the national interest.
One of the most pressing concerns of security experts and policymakers in the early 1990s was to secure the weapons of the former U.S.S.R. while that empire imploded. In 1991, the breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
These newly independent states, each of which was "born nuclear," were ultimately convinced to give up their inherited weapons, and all of those nuclear weapons were repatriated to Russia, but not without much anxiety. That the new states would simply give up these powerful bargaining chips was no foregone conclusion. The Nunn-Lugar program, with considerable U.S. funding to secure these weapons, aided in achieving a successful transfer. The sheer numbers of nuclear weapons even combined with this relatively modest dispersal illustrated the problem of command, control, and security in an environment of deteriorating military infrastructure. Whether a cash-strapped military complex might look to liquidate its assets or the compromising of security measures allowed theft, the threat to the international community was acute.
The problem seemed even more worrying with those weapons dispersed further afield. During the Cold War, both sides deployed tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, well beyond their own borders in the name of forward defense and pre-positioning. 
Nuclear Deterrence for the Post-Cold War Era
The breakup of the Soviet Union augured a new reality in which "The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with little or no warning, was no longer a realistic threat." Gorbachev shared the sentiment, describing it as a revolution in strategic thinking; no longer should the deterrent to war be the threat of war. "Our next goal," he said, "is to make full use of this breakthrough to make disarmament an irreversible process"
By the time Bill Clinton assumed the presidency the euphoria of the end of the Cold War was giving way to more sober analysis. It had become increasingly apparent that the problems associated with nuclear weapons had not actually faded away -they had simply been transformed. Rather than opening an era of global peace and security, the end of the Cold War paved the way for instability and the resurfacing of regional issues that had long been suppressed. Sarajevo, Kosovo and Rwanda became household words.
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration pressed ahead with its efforts to align nuclear policy with new circumstances. In late 1993 it announced that the U.S. Government had adopted a new understanding of "deterrence." A wide-ranging and thorough "Bottom Up Review," conducted by the Pentagon during 1993, identified a number of key threats to U.S. national security. Foremost among them was the increased threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The new "deterrence," therefore, would be aimed at deterring not only the threat to use nuclear weapons but also the acquisition of atomic technology and materials. By employing significant military and economic disincentives, the administration hoped to neutralize some of the chief threats to stability such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya.
But the central thrust of U.S. nuclear policy remained the potential of a resurgent Russia. In keeping with its redefinition of "deterrence," the Clinton administration announced in September 1994 that it was adopting a new nuclear doctrine. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction or MAD was to be replaced with a policy of mutual assured safety, aimed primarily at the Russian heartland. This served a dual purpose: first, to provide leadership for continuing reductions in nuclear weapons, and, second, and more critically, to provide a hedge against a reversal of the reform process in Russia. Although it remained unlikely that Russia's weak economy could rebuild a conventional force of the magnitude that it had maintained during the Cold War, U.S. defense planners speculated that nuclear weapons might offer an attractive, cheaper option to a new generation of Russian leaders.
In November 1997, Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive describing in general terms the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons while providing broad guidance for developing operational plans. It was the first such presidential directive on the actual employment of nuclear weapons since the Carter administration. It was notable in that Washington finally abandoned the Cold War tenet that it must be prepared to fight a protracted nuclear war. The directive also noted that strategic nuclear weapons would play a smaller role in the U.S. security posture than at any other point during the second half of the twentieth-century, but that they were still a vital part of U.S. efforts as a hedge against an uncertain future. But for those that believed that deterrence was a thing of the past, Clinton's directive served as a sharp reminder that not much had changed. In words, still ringing from those at the height of the cold war, the Clinton administration declared:
Deterrence is predicated on ensuring that potential adversaries accept that any use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies would not succeed…A wide range of nuclear retaliatory options are required to ensure that the United States is not left with an all-or-nothing response…The United States will retain sufficient ambiguity of use that an adversary could never be sure that the United States would not launch a counter-attack before the adversary's weapons arrive. 
Effectiveness of Non-proliferation Efforts
Non-proliferation efforts in recent years have enjoyed mixed results. On the one hand, nuclear stockpiles have been reduced markedly, with some of that fissile material being converted to peaceful purposes by blending down bomb-grade plutonium and uranium to lower-grade versions more suitable for nuclear power production. "One out of every ten light bulbs in the United States is powered by a former Soviet bomb," boasted Ambassador Linton Brooks, administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. On the other hand, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile materials falling into the wrong hands seems greater than ever. It was a proliferation breakthrough of unusual drama. It was also sobering: the network was sophisticated, effective, and had operated undetected for several years. Though A.Q. Khan and his known cohorts are out of business, there is still the great, unanswered question, Who else might have access to the nuclear technology he and his network proliferated? We simply don't know, according to
As of September
London strategic studies think-tank chief, John Chipman, as "Pakistan has never made public Khan's confession, the details of its investigation into the network, including who was arrested and who was simply detained 'for debriefing', the charges and laws under which Khan's associates were detained, the grounds for their release, or the identities of those who were put under a form of continued 'house arrest'." Pakistan has stopped providing information on the official grounds that the Khan case is closed. In addition, most of Khan's foreign accomplices remain free and only three have been convicted and imprisoned. The upshot is the real concern that international framework of export controls still contains serious gaps that could well be exploited by a network similar to that of Khan's. Efforts to roll back the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race have been spectacularly unsuccessful.
Admittedly, the problem had been handled very differently from the Libyan case. India joined the nuclear club with a successful test on May 18, 1974, having begun its program in response to the border clash with China in November 1962, with China developing its own bomb two years later.
x Since then, India maintained a "dual front" approach to is defense planning, with Pakistan and China clearly in its sights. But it is the India-Pakistan front that has been the cause of intense global concern since things heated up considerably in mid-1998. The two countries have had a marked history of conflict during the relatively short life of the Pakistani nation. It is a rivalry fueled by many cultural and security issues, and it has a ready-made flashpoint in the contested territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
Since 1947, when Pakistan was carved off India by the British, serious military conflict has broken out between the two sides at least four times. Each time India has won. The injection of nuclear weapons into that volatile mix has naturally led to widespread concern. In May 1998, India tested five nuclear weapons. Before the month was out, Pakistan had hastily responded with six nuclear tests of its own. Each side engaged in saber-rattling rhetoric and tension has built up on several occasions since, most notably in brinkmanship of dual mobilizations in 2002. The tests provoked widespread international condemnation aimed at both parties.
Whether nuclear weapons stabilize or destabilize the India-Pakistan rivalry remains a controversial question. Deterrence optimists argue that the risks of even a small scale nuclear exchange on the subcontinent, where the urban environments would almost certainly lead to millions of deaths, should force each side back from the brink. Former Indian minister of external affairs Jaswant Singh fell in that camp, adding that those who were condemning India's nuclear policies loudest were engaging in what amounted to "nuclear apartheid." "If deterrence works in the West-as it so obviously appears to," he argued, "by what reasoning will it not work in India?" xi The Pakistani leadership professed similar views: a nuclear conflict would surely have no victor. In South Asia, nuclear deterrence may, however, usher in an era of durable peace between Pakistan and India, providing the requisite incentives for resolving all outstanding issues, especially Jammu and Kashmir. This is the optimistic view. Deterrence pessimists argue, however, that such a view places far too much trust in the organizational integrity of the respective military establishments. Could either side actually control the escalation of a crisis even if they wanted to? Many security experts think not.
The nuclear experience of recent years suggests that the underlying approach of creating rigorous international norms and inspection supervisory regimes remains the best and most effective way of controlling nuclear threats. Mohamed El Baradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy
Agency and winner of the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize holds that "We cannot respond to these threats by building more walls, developing bigger weapons or dispatching more troops. These threats require primarily multinational cooperation." The IAEA works with the atomic programs in more than 100
countries. El Baradei estimates that as many as 49 nations know how to make nuclear weapons and warns that global tension could well push some over the line. Still, the situation is not as bad as John F.
Kennedy worried about in 1963 when he predicted that there could be well over 15 or 20 nuclear powers by end of the decade. Interestingly, his concern was not that developing nations would acquire the bomb but rather that advanced industrial economies would do so, particularly West German and Japan. Several European nations, including neutral Sweden, which was then developing plans to build 100 nuclear weapons to quip its armed forces, were already actively pursuing nuclear weapons programs.
On the other side of the ledger, the Bush administration's policies had been informed by a robust skepticism of the actual effectiveness of international controls and have often emphasized more aggressive counter-proliferation efforts, turning its attention more and more to deterring the acquisition of atomic technology and materials, a policy initiated in the Clinton years. Bush revealed himself to be a deterrence pessimist of the first order. In justifying the invasion of Iraq, Bush declared: "I acted because I was not about to leave the security of the American people in the hands of a madman. I was not about to stand by and wait and trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein." The clarity of the Cold War world has given way to the ambiguities and uncertainties of a world where global security is threatened by regime collapse, nuclear terrorism, new nuclear weapons states and regional conflict, and preexisting nuclear arsenals. The dangers inherent in such a mix are in themselves greatly magnified by easier access to nuclear technology, inadequately protected stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the growing availability of missiles worldwide (31 nations with ballistic missiles), black market nuclear supply networks, and a trend toward acquisition of "latent" nuclear weapons capabilities through the possession of the entire
